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THE AVAILABILITY OF HABEAS CORPUS IN OHIO TO
ATTACK A CRIMINAL INDICTMENT AFTER CONVICTION
Perry v. Maxwell
175 Ohio St. 369, 195 N.E.2d 103 (1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 958 (1964)
After entering a plea of guilty, petitioner was sentenced to the Ohio
Penitentiary on an indictment charging armed robbery.' By failing to file
notice of appeal within thirty days after final judgment and sentencing,
petitioner lost his appeal as of right under Ohio law.2 Subsequently, he filed
a motion in the court of appeals for a discretionary grant of leave to appeal,
urging, as grounds for error, that the indictment under which he was con-
victed failed to allege all the essential elements of a crime under the laws of
Ohio.3 The motion was denied, and the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed that
denial.4 Petitioner, pending his appeal, had instituted the instant proceeding
by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus5 in the court of appeals. 6
The petition was based upon the same grounds urged in the motion for
leave to appeal.7 The court of appeals, after reaching the merits of peti-
tioner's contention, dismissed the writ.8 The Ohio Supreme Court, with
two judges dissenting, affirmed, holding that petitioner could attack his
indictment by motion at the trial or by appeal, but not collaterally by habeas
corpus.9
1 Pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2901.13 (Page 1954).
2 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2953.05 (Page Supp. 1964) provides for an appeal as of
right if notice of appeal is filed in the court of appeals within thirty days after judg-
ment and sentencing. If the defendant has not exercised his right to appeal within the
statutory period he may, at any time thereafter seek leave to appeal from the court,
but such an appeal is discretionary and may be granted only by the court to which the
appeal is taken.
8 Brief in Support of Motion for Leave to Appeal from the Court of Appeals,
Hamilton County, pp. 5-10, State v. Perry, 175 Ohio St. 290, 194 N.E2d 56 (1963).
4 State v. Perry, 175 Ohio St. 290, 194 N.E2d 56 (1963).
5 Chapter 2725 of the Ohio Revised Code contains the general provisions for
habeas corpus. The procedural steps and the form of the petition are provided for in
§§ 2725.04-.15. Section 2725.03 provides that the supreme court, the court of appeals,
the courts of common pleas and the probate courts shall have jurisdiction to issue the
writ. Under the latter section any judge of the above mentioned courts may issue the
writ. The supreme court and the court of appeals are also granted authority to issue
the writ by the Ohio Constitution Article IV, sections 2 and 6 respectively.
6 Pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2725.03 (Page 1954).
7 Brief for Appellant, pp. 3-7, Perry v. Maxwell, 175 Ohio St. 369, 195 N.E2d
103 (1963).
8 Perry v. Maxwell, No. 7121, Franklin Co. Ct. App., Dec. 11, 1962.
9 Perry v. Maxwell, 175 Ohio St. 369, 195 N.E2d 103 (1963). The United States
Supreme Court subsequently denied certiorari, 377 U.S. 958 (1964).
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The language of the Ohio Supreme Court in the instant case is indica-
tive of recent cases in which the court has narrowly construed the availa-
bility of habeas corpus in Ohio as a postconviction remedy. By invoking the
doctrines of comity and waiver, the court has narrowed the scope of this
traditional writ until it has become-with several important exceptions-
solely a preconviction remedy. The grounds given for this virtual emascula-
tion of the writ have been that appeal is an adequate remedy; that habeas
corpus should not be a substitute for appeal; and that only errors which go
to the jurisdiction of the court are cognizable in habeas corpus. It is in
the first and the last of these areas that the court has sought by judicial
construction to avoid the flood of habeas corpus petitions which have fol-
lowed recent United States Supreme Court rulings.10
From the time it was incorporated into the common law of Ohio, the
writ of habeas corpus has been considered a proper remedy for illegal re-
straints or convictions rendered by courts without proper jurisdiction."
The case law adhering to this view has been codified by section 2725.05 of
the Ohio Revised Code.1 2 In setting forth the instances in which habeas
corpus should not be allowed the statute provides:
If it appears that a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is
in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or
magistrate, or by virtue of the judgment or order of a court of
record, and that the court or magistrate had jurisdiction to issue
the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ of
habeas corpus shall not be allowed. If the jurisdiction appears after
the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason
of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order.' 3
The per curiam majority opinion in the instant case and the opinions
of the two dissenting judges point out the two distinct issues involved.
Judge Herbert's brief dissent 14 implicitly attacks the majority's holding
that the omission of an essential element does not deprive the trial court
of jurisdiction even if the court has rendered judgment on that indictment.
10 The following statistics relating to habeas corpus proceedings originating in the
Ohio Supreme Court were set forth in 38 Ohio Bar 113 (1965) :
Cases or Petitions Filed: Petitions Heard & Disposed of:
1957- 2
1962-29 1962-21
1963-33 1963-35
1964-83 1964-71
In the beginnig of 1965 there were reported to be 160 merit cases on the Ohio
Supreme Court's docket of which 27 were habeas corpus cases.
11 State v. Cimpritz, 158 Ohio St. 490, 110 N.E2d 416 (1953); Ex parte Bushnell,
9 Ohio St. 77 (1859); Ex parte Shaw, 7 Ohio St. 81 (1858); Cantaway v. Maxwell,
120 Ohio App. 439, 203 N.E2d 258 (1964).
12 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2725.05 (Page 1954).
13 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2725.05 (Page 1954). (Emphasis added.)
14 Perry v. Maxwell, 175 Ohio St. 369, 371, 195 N.E2d 103, 105 (1963) (dissent-
ing opinion).
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Although Judge Herbert states no more than that he dissents on the au-
thority of State v. Cimpritz,15 his dissent raises questions which go to the
very heart of the majority decision. An examination of Cimpritz and sub-
sequent cases shows that the court has made an awkward transition in
reaching its position in the instant case. In the Cimpritz case, the defendant
appealed a conviction under an indictment which charged attempted bur-
glary but which omitted the words "maliciously and forcibly." The Ohio
Supreme Court held that such an indictment was fatally defective and that
the trial court had never obtained jurisdiction of the subject matter. Judge
Zimmerman speaking for the majority stated that:
[A] judgment of conviction based on an indictment which does
not charge an offense is void for lack of jurisdiction of the subject
matter and may be successfully attacked either on direct appeal
to a reviewing court or by a collateral proceeding."0
Although this statement was incorporated into the court's syllabus, it
is conceded to be, at best, strong dictum in light of the fact that Cimpritz
was appealing his conviction rather than proceeding in habeas corpus. The
result reached in Cimpritz is based upon the assertion that there is no com-
mon law of crimes in Ohio. The enactment of a comprehensive criminal
code at the inception of Ohio's statehood has consistently been held to have
abrogated common law crimes. 17 Under this theory of common law ouster
the only criminal acts in Ohio are those which the legislature has expressly
designated as criminal. It can be argued that if the state in its indictment
has failed to allege every essential element of any one crime, then the de-
fendant has not been charged with any crime. Therefore, if there has been
an essential allegation or element omitted, it should follow that the omission
is fatal to the court's jurisdiction.'8
In the light of two subsequent decisions by the court, it appears that
Judge Zimmerman's earlier position is to be distinguished from the case
where the defendant failed to attack the indictment at the trial level. In re
Bryant 19 involved a defendant convicted of forging a driver's license. Bryant
contended that the statute under which he was indicted and convicted did
not apply to driver's licenses. The court here apparently applied a different
interpretation of jurisdiction of the subject matter, for it held without ex-
planation that the trial court had jurisdiction of the person and of the sub-
15 158 Ohio St. 490, 110 N.E2d 416 (1953).
16 Id. at 494, 110 N.E.2d at 418.
17 State v. Cimpritz, supra note 11; Smith v. State, 12 Ohio St. 466 (1861);
Vanvalkenburg v. State, 11 Ohio 404 (1842).
18 See Simpson v. Maxwell, 1 Ohio St. 2d. 71, 72, - N.E2d - (1964)
(dictum); Jetter v. Maxwell, 176 Ohio St. 219, 229, 198 N.E2d 668, 669, (1964)
(dictum); Anderson v. Maxwell, 175 Ohio St. 210, 211, 192 N.E2d 779, 780, (1963)
(dictum) ; Stewart v. State, 41 Ohio App. 351, 181 N.E. 111 (1932) ; Annot., 57 A.L.R.
85, 87 (1928) ; 4 Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure § 1769 (12th ed. 1957) ; 5
Wharton, supra § 2233; Joyce, Indictments § 49 (2d ed. 1924).
19 171 Ohio St. 16, 167 N.E2d 500 (1960).
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ject matter and, therefore, that petitioner's only remedy was to seek a
review on appeal. In State v. Wozniak,20 the court attempted to reconcile
Bryant and Cimpritz by noting that an indictment which does not charge
an offense is void but that after conviction a judgment is binding as between
the state and the court "where the court rendering it had jurisdiction of the
person of the defendant and also jurisdiction of the subject matter, i.e.,
jurisdiction to try the defendant for the crine for which he was convicted."21
From these statements it becomes apparent that the court in Bryant and
Wozniak has altered its previous interpretation of jurisdiction of the subject
matter. Judge Zimmerman in Cimpritz found the judgment void for lack
of jurisdiction of the subject matter because the indictment was fatally de-
fective. In Bryant and Wozniak the court apparently based jurisdiction of
the subject matter upon the offense generally rather than upon the form in
which the offense is charged.22
An analysis of State v. Wozniak23 shows that it was in this case that
the critical transition was made by the court. After quoting syllabus six
from the Cinipritz case,24 the court noted that amendment by the trial court
of an indictment to supply a missing charge of an essential element of the
crime would be unconstitutional under Section 10 of Article I of the Ohio
Constitution.25 Despite these considerations, the court in dictum went on
to state that the judgment of the lower court could not be set aside collater-
ally after a judgment of conviction bad been rendered.2 6 On the basis of
the allegedly analogous civil authority of Mantho v. Board of Liquor
Control,2 7 the court asserted that such a judgment of conviction was bind-
ing as between the state and the defendant even though the defendant might
stand convicted under a void indictment.28 By relying upon Mantho the
court apparently invoked a theory that the objection to lack of jurisdiction
20 172 Ohio St 517, 178 N.E2d 800 (1961).
21 Id. at 522, 178 N.E.2d at 804. (Emphasis added.) It should be noted that the
court in quoting the syllabus from Cimpritz for the second time significantly omitted
the words "for lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter" thus ignoring or avoiding
the very obstacle to its ultimate conclusion.
22 Accord, Doughty v. Sacks, 173 Ohio St. 407, 183 N.E2d 368 (1962), rev'd on
other grounds sub nora. Doughty v. Maxwell, 376 U.S. 202 (1964).
23 Supra note 20.
24 State v. Cimpritz, supra note 11 at 490, 110 N.E2d at 416. The sixth syllabus
of the court reads as follows:
A judgment of conviction based on an indictment which does not charge
an offense is void for lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter and may be at-
tacked successfully either on direct appeal to a reviewing court or by a collateral
proceeding.
25 Ohio Const. art. I, § 10 provides that "no person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous, crime, unless on presentment or indictment of a grand
jury...."
20 This curiously retrospective overruling of the dictum in Cimpritz by further
dictum suggests that the court might already have been anticipating an increase in the
applications for the writ.
27 162 Ohio St. 37, 120 N.E2d 730 (1954).
28 State v. Wozniak, supra note 20, at 522-23, 178 N.E.2d at 804.
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had been waived. Mantho involved an appeal from a decision of the court
of common pleas reversing the State Liquor Board's refusal to renew the
liquor licenses of appellees. In the Ohio Supreme Court, the licensees
argued that under the Ohio Administrative Procedure Act,29 the Liquor
Board had no standing to appeal from an adverse ruling in the common
pleas court and that, therefore, the court of appeals had no jurisdiction.
The supreme court held that the court of appeals had general appellate
jurisdiction and that the appellees waived their objection by failing to raise
it before the court of appeals had rendered a decision on the merits. It is
difficult to see the analogy between the situation in Mantho and the situ-
ation in Wozniak. Not only did Mantho involve the somewhat peculiar
characteristics of appellate jurisdiction, but it also involved a statutory
limitation upon an existing authorization of general jurisdiction. It is
submitted that neither of these problems was involved in either Wozniak or
in any of the subsequent habeas corpus cases which have accepted the
dictum of Wozniak.
It was not long before the court was faced with the anomalous result
of the rationale of the Wozniak case. In Bolin v. Maxwell,3" the petitioner
had been indicted as the codefendant of Wozniak. Bolin, not prosecuting
an appeal as had Wozniak, sought a writ of habeas corpus after Wozniak's
conviction was modified by a finding that one count of the two count indict-
ment was fatally defective.31 At the time that Bolin applied for the writ,
the court had already held that a count similar in every respect to the
count returned by the grand jury against Bolin and under which Bolin had
been convicted was fatally defective.3 2 The state, as respondent, could not
effectively argue that the indictment was valid because of the prior decision
in Wozniak. But the state could effectively argue by virtue of the same
case that Bolin was precluded from attacking his indictment by habeas
corpus. With Judges Bell and Matthias dissenting, the court in a per
curiam decision, again without explanation, held that habeas corpus was
not the proper way to attack an indictment. 33 The decision was rendered
over the protestations of Judge Bell that "this is a classic example for the
allowance of habeas corpus." 34
The instant case contains another dissent, treating the problems pre-
sented by the holding in the Perry case. The majority opinion expressly
relied upon the conclusion that petitioner had an adequate remedy either
in the trial court or the court of appeals. Judge Gibson directs his dissent
29 120 Laws of Ohio, 358, 366 (1963) [Now Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 119.12 (Page
1953)].
30 173 Ohio St. 517, 184 N.E.2d 91 (1961).
31 State v. Wozniak, supra note 20. Wozniak had been indicted on one count of
possession of burglary tools and one count relating to attempted burglary. Upon appeal
the court held that the count on possession was void but remanded Wozniak on the
second count.
32 State v. Wozniak, supra note 20.
33 Bolin v. Maxwell, 173 Ohio St. 517, 184 N.E2d 91 (1961).
34 Id. at 518, 184 N.E2d at 92 (dissenting opinion).
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to the argument that, since the court of appeals did not render an opinion
on the merits of petitioner's motion for leave to appeal, the Ohio Supreme
Court cannot determine whether the court of appeals abused its discretion.35
The criminal appellate procedure in Ohio provides for an appeal as of
right if notice of appeal is filed within thirty days after final judgment.
Any time thereafter, the defendant may move for leave to appeal.36 Such
an appeal, however, is discretionary with the court and rests upon a
showing that the defendant acted reasonably in waiting for more than
the thirty-day period.3 7 Gibson's objection seems valid for in at least one
case the Ohio Supreme Court has refused habeas corpus on the ground
that petitioner should have proceeded by appealing the lower court's
refusal to grant leave to appeal.
38
The dissent, in the instant case, asserts that the court is telling peti-
tioner, in effect, that the correct remedy is the very remedy which he has
already been refused. "Thus, petitioner now is in the position that he can
never have a review on the merits of his contention." 39 As Judge Gibson
notes, the court of appeals has discretion in ruling on a motion for leave to
appeal.4 0 But such discretion is not unbridled. The court should note the
reasons for failure to file a timely appeal as well as probable error in the
proceedings of the trial court.4 1 Arguably, the Ohio Supreme Court's rul-
ings that certain fundamental issues are not cognizable on habeas corpus
imply that a standard more favorable to the defendant will be applied to
motions for leave to appeal. Gibson suggests that these discretionary motions
should or must be granted unless the defendants "are clearly not so en-
titled. .... ,' 42 This would be a helpful but certainly not a definitive answer
to the problem. It is doubtful whether any standard can or even should be
developed for the exercise of a discretionary power. Each case must be
decided upon its particular facts. However, discretion, like any other
power, can be abused.43 Without written findings of the court of appeals,
such abuses becomes incorrectable because the supreme court cannot review
35 Perry v. Maxwell, supra note 7, at 371, 195 N.E2d at 105 (dissenting
opinion).
36 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2953.05 (Page Supp. 1964).
37 See Skeel, "Some Aspects of Appellate Procedure in Ohio," 12 W. Res. L.
Rev. 645 (1961), for a discussion of general Ohio appellate procedure.
38 Schaber v. Maxwell, 176 Ohio St. 58, 197 N.E.2d 361 (1964).
39 Perry v. Maxwell, supra note 7, at 372, 195 N.E2d at 105 (dissenting opinion).
40 See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2953.05 (Page Supp. 1964).
41 McCoy v. Maxwell, 176 Ohio St. 249, 199 N.E.2d 2 (1964).
42 Jerry v. Maxwell, supra note 7, at 372, 195 N.E.2d at 105 (dissenting opinion).
43 In the recent case of Walker v. Maxwell, 1 Ohio St. 2d 136,--N.E.2d-(1965),
the court stated at 138,--N.E.2d at-:
Where an accused has failed to pursue his appeal within the statutory
period for appeals as a matter of right he has available to him the motion
for leave to appeal. This is not an empty right. If the accused can show
reasonable grounds for his delay in pursuing his appeal as matter of. right
within the statutory period or if the failure to grant such appeal would
result in a clear miscarriage of justice, to deny such a motion would consti-
tute an abuse of discretion.
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the ruling to determine whether there was an abuse of discretion. It cannot
be presumed, according to Judge Gibson, that the court of appeals did not
abuse its discretion and, therefore, that petitioner had an adequate remedy
by way of appeal.44 Any remedy which does not allow the petitioner to
have at least one appellate hearing on the merits of his claim cannot be
considered adequate. Judicial finality should not be invoked in such a way
as to prevent the petitioner from obtaining a hearing on the merits of his
claimed illegal restraint.
Ohio prisoners have fared no better in federal courts than in state
courts, despite the recent habeas corpus cases which have liberally con-
strued and expanded federal jurisdiction to accept petitions from state
prisoners. Perhaps the case which is most frequently misinterpreted by the
prisoner-petitioner is the recent decision in Fay v. Noia.45 The Fay case
interpreted the federal habeas corpus statute46 as requiring the exhaustion
of only those remedies available at the time that the federal writ is sought.
However, the Court specifically stated that the holding would not overrule
the previous case of Brown v. Allen47 as far as deliberate or negligent
lapsing of time to perfect an appeal. In such an instance, federal habeas
corpus would still be barred to defendants who failed to perfect their
appeals within the time limits prescribed by state law.48 It should be noted
that the federal district court may make a separate finding as to the pris-
oner's efforts to perfect an appeal. It is not bound by any determination of
the state court in this regard.49 This gives a great deal of discretion to the
district judge, which he may exercise in granting or denying the writ.
A recent federal court of appeals decision applying Fay v. Noia to an
Ohio prisoner still required the state prisoner to exhaust his state remedies
of habeas corpus and delayed appeal before seeking the federal writ.50
Since Brown had previously held that a state habeas corpus proceeding
was not a prerequisite to federal jurisdiction, the Sixth Circuit is probably
pronouncing its own policy. It would not seem, however, in light of the
Ohio Supreme Court's pronouncements with respect to availability of
44 Perry v. Maxwell, supra note 7, at 372, 195 N.E.2d at 105 (dissenting opinion).
45 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
46 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1958), which provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a state court shall not be granted unless it
appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts
of the State, or that there is either an absence of available State corrective
process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective
to protect the rights of the prisoner.
An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies
available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if
he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available
procedure, the question presented.
47 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
48 Id. at 485-86.
49 Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313 (1963).
50 Saulsbury v. Green, 318, F2d 320 (6th Cir. 1963).
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habeas corpus to attack an indictment, that the federal court would require
exhaustion of state remedies. One federal district judge has allowed the
federal writ on the assumption that the Ohio courts would probably refuse
the state writ.';
The net result of the Ohio cases, including the instant case, is that the
jurisdictional grounds for maintaining a collateral attack on an indictment
after rendering of judgment have been almost entirely emasculated. The
inescapable conclusion is that there are no conceivable groups upon which
such a contention can be effectively raised by a collateral proceeding. The
fact that the indictment is fatally defective or void is immaterial if the
petitioner has not sought to remedy his alleged injustice by appeal. If he
has been able to maintain the same issue on appeal and that issue has been
decided against him, then he is also precluded from raising it on habeas
corpus.5 2 The instant case successfully closes out the last remaining possi-
bility: where the defendant has sought but been denied appeal without
consideration of the merits of his claim.
As a matter of policy it may be practical to limit the availability of
habeas corpus in such a way that it is not used as a substitute for appeal
or a means of circumventing normal and orderly procedures. However, it
is submitted that in many instances it may be more practical for the judi-
ciary to consider the merits of the defendant's claim than to direct him to
recourse through the appellate procedure.53 In Ohio every petition for
habeas corpus filed with the supreme court is investigated by master com-
missioners appointed by the court.54 In every case there is a hearing with
the state putting forth its evidence as to the validity of the prisoner's deten-
tion. With these findings before them, the court could give the prisoner
his one "pass over the course" and thus obviate the need for review of a
motion for leave to appeal. In the Bolin case,5 5 Judge Bell succinctly noted
that since the court seemed to agree that the indictment was absolutely
void, "the ends of justice would be accomplished more effectively by allow-
ing such relief in this action, thus preventing the circuity of action which
the majority opinion necessitates."'56
51 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 231 F. Supp. 37 (S.D. Ohio 1964).
52 Naples v. Maxwell, 176 Ohio St. 443, 200 N.E.2d 340 (1964); Graff v.
Green, 172 Ohio St. 294, 175 NXE2d 304 (1961); Ex parte Stringer, 171 Ohio St.
400, 171 N.E2d 337 (1960).
53 Professor Paul Freund suggests that habeas corpus proceedings enjoy at
least two advantages: (1) some defects which do not appear on the record for
appeal can be considered on habeas corpus; (2) the state of the trial court's
records may require fresh findings of fact. "Habeas Corpus-Proposals For Reform,"
9 Utah L. Rev. 18, 27 (1964).
G4 Such has become the practice under rule VIII, section 14 of the Rules of
Practice of the Ohio Supreme Court. See McCann v. Maxwell, 174 Ohio St. 282,
189 N.E2d 143 (1963), which upheld the propriety of referring petitions to master
commissioners for hearings.
55 Bolin v. Maxwell, supra note 30.
56 Id. at 518, 184 N.E2d at 92 (dissenting opinion).
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It must be noted that the doctrine pronounced in Wazniak and fol-
lowed in the instant case is not a doctrine of exhaustion of remedies. The
supreme court has concluded that whenever appeal is an adequate remedy,
i.e., whenever the defendant could have maintained his argument on appeal,
habeas corpus will not serve as a substitute. Whether or not this doctrine
is an attempt to avoid the effects of recent United States Supreme Court
cases liberally construing the writ of habeas corpus is not known and
obviously cannot be determined from the pronouncements of the Ohio
court in its per curiam opinions. Habeas corpus petitioners should not be
allowed purposeful attempts to by-pass the orderly judicial processes of
the state, but when an appeal is not available the prisoner should not be
forever precluded from raising the merits of his claim. Appeal is an ade-
quate remedy only when such remedy is available, and under circumstances
such as those present in this case appeal is not an adequate remedy.57
Ohio habeas corpus is at this time in a state of flux. 58 Recent right-to-
57 Ohio procedure provides several statutory methods of attacking the conviction
and judgment both before and immediately following such judgment. See Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. §§ 2941.54, 2941.57, 2945.79, 2947.02 (Page 1954). But the postjudgment
attacks must be made within three days. Probably the most compelling reason for
leaving habeas corpus open as an avenue for correction of illegal restraints is that
Ohio judges have no statutory authority for appointing counsel to argue appeals
for indigent defendants. In addition the appellate courts have held that the fact that
a defendant did not realize that his sentence was illegal is not sufficient grounds for
allowing the discretionary appeal. Ex parte Hertz, 139 N.E.2d 645 (Ohio Ct. App.
1953).
58 The following case citations are not meant to exhaust the Ohio Supreme
Court's pronouncements on the subject of postconviction remedies but rather to
indicate that authority is not solely for or against the availability of such remedy. No
attempt is made to determine what factors allow the Ohio prisoners to attack success-
fully a conviction by habeas corpus since most of the cases hold that such an attack
is not available.
I. Cases in which the courts have refused to consider the merits of petitioner's claims.
(A) indictment not supported by evidence: Dean v. Green, 177 Ohio St. 22, 201
N.E.2d 598 (1964); Cook v. Maxwell, 177 Ohio St. 18, 201 N.E2d 597 (1964);
Villasino v. Maxwell, 174 Ohio St. 483, 190 N.E.2d 265 (1963). (B) defenses and
questions of evidence: McElroy v. Maxwell, 177 Ohio St. 16, 201 N.E2d 527 (1964) ;
Brown v. Maxwell, 174 Ohio St. 29, 186 N.E.2d 612 (1962); In re Poage, 87 Ohio
St. 72, 100 N.E. 125 (1912). (C) competency of counsel: Poe v. Maxwell, 177 Ohio
St. 28, 201 N.E.2d 703 (1964) ; Swogger v. Maxwell, 176 Ohio St. 415, 200 N.E.2d
313 (1964) ; Vaughn v. Maxwell, 176 Ohio St. 289, 199 N.E.2d 570 (1964) ; Henderson
v. Maxwell, 176 Ohio St. 187, 198 N.E.2d 456 (1964) ; Schaber v. Maxwell, 176 Ohio
St. 58, 197 N.E.2d 361 (1964) ; Gallagher v. Maxwell, 175 Ohio St. 440, 195 N.E.2d
810 (1964) ; Lancaster v. Green, 175 Ohio St. 203, 192 N.E.2d 776 (1963) ; Jackson
v. Maxwell, 174 Ohio St. 32, 186 N.E.2d 725 (1962) ; Rodriquez v. Sacks, 173 Ohio
St. 456, 184 N.E.2d 93 (1962) ; McConnaughy v. Alvis, 165 Ohio St. 102, 133 N.E2d
133 (1956). (D) procedural irregularities in arrest: Simpson v. Maxwell, 1 Ohio St.
2d 71, 203 N.E2d 314 (1964) ; Shelton v. Haskins, 176 Ohio St. 297, 199 N.E2d 597
(1964) ; Jetter v. Maxwell, 176 Ohio St. 219, 198 N.E.2d 668 (1964) ; Anderson v.
Maxwell, 175 Ohio St. 210, 192 N.E.2d 779 (1963) ; Wells v. Maxwell, 174 Ohio St.
198, 188 N.E.2d 160 (1963); Brown v. Maxwell, 174 Ohio St. 29, 186 N.E2d 612
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counsel cases are but one reflection of the unsettled and cloudy position of
the Ohio court in relation to habeas corpus generally. 9 It seems to be
(1962). (E) refusal to supply indigent defendant with transcript of testimony for
appeal: Cook v. Maxwell, 177 Ohio St. 18, 201 N.E.2d 597 (1964); Shelton v.
Haskins, 176 Ohio St. 296, 199 N.E.2d 598 (1964); Vaughn v. Maxwell, 176 Ohio
St. 289, 199 N.E.2d 570 (1964); McCoy v. Maxwell, 176 Ohio St. 249, 199 N.E.2d
2 (1964); Tinsley v. Maxwell, 176 Ohio St. 185, 198 N.E2d 673 (1964). (F)
irregularities in selecting grand jurors: Cantrell v. Maxwell, 177 Ohio St. 15, 201
N.E.2d 593 (1964) ; Charles v. Maxwell, 176 Ohio St. 217, 193 N.E.2d 773 (1964) ;
State ex rel. Burton v. Smith, 174 Ohio St. 429, 189 N.E.2d 876 (1963) ; Huling v.
State, 17 Ohio St. 583 (1867). (G) innocence of petitioner and admissibility of evi-
dence: Dean v. Green, 177 Ohio St. 22, 201 N.E.2d 598 (1964) ; Cook v. Maxwell, 177
Ohio St. 18, 201 N.E.2d 597 (1964) ; Page v. Green, 174 Ohio St. 178, 187 N.E.2d 592
(1963); Rodriquez v. Sacks, 173 Ohio St. 456, 184 N.E.2d 93 (1962); Spence v.
Sacks, 173 Ohio St. 419, 183 N.E.2d 363 (1962) ; In re Poage, 87 Ohio St. 72, 100
N.E. 125 (1912). (H) double jeopardy: Poe v. Maxwell, 177 Ohio St. 28, 201 N.E.2d
703 (1964) ; Lowther v. Maxwell, 175 Ohio St. 39, 191 N.E.2d 172 (1963) ; Page v.
Green, 174 Ohio St. 178, 187 N.E.2d 592 (1963) ; Maloney v. Maxwell, 174 Ohio St.
84, 186 N.E.2d 728 (1962); Jackson v. Maxwell, 174 Ohio St. 32, 186 N.E.2d 725
(1962) ; Foran v. Maxwell, 173 Ohio St. 561, 184 N.E.2d 398 (1962); Vertz v.
Maxwell, 173 Ohio St. 459, 183 N.E2d 924 (1962) ; Weaver v. Sacks, 173 Ohio St
415, 183 N.E.2d 373 (1962); Barker v. Sacks, 173 Ohio St. 413, 183 N.E.2d 385
(1962); lit re Poage, 87 Ohio St. 72, 100 N.E. 125 (1912). (I) right to allocution:
Lancaster v. Green, 175 Ohio St. 203, 192 N.E.2d 776 (1963). (J) perjured testimony:
O'Bannon v. Haskins, 1 Ohio St. 2d 110, 205 N.E.2d 16 (1965); White v. Maxwell,
174 Ohio St. 186, 187 N.E2d 878 (1963).
II. Cases in which the court did not question the petitioner's ability to raise the
issue by habeas corpus.
(A) compulsory process to obtain witnesses: Lancaster v. Green, 175 Ohio St.
203, 192 N.E.2d 776 (1963); Rodriguez v. Sacks, 173 Ohio St. 456, 184 N.E2d 93
(1962). (B) right to a speedy trial: Partsch v. Haskins, 175 Ohio St. 139, 191 N.E2d
N.E2d 804 (1963). (D) delay in sentencing: Neal v. Maxwell, 175 Ohio St. 201, 192
N.E2d 782 (1963). (E) running of sentence while on parole: Bush v. Maxwell, 175
Ohio St. 207, 192 N.E.2d 774 (1963). (F) validity of arrest: Anderson v. Maxwell,
175 Ohio St. 210, 192 N.E2d 779 (1963). (G) legality of arrest, search and seizure
without warrant, and admissibility of evidence: Poe v. Maxwell, 177 Ohio St. 28,
201 N.E2d 703 (1964) ; Dixon v. Maxwell, 177 Ohio St. 20, 201 N.E.2d 592 (1964).
(H) extradition: Murphy v. Maxwell, 176 Ohio St. 297, 199 N.E2d 597 (1964).
(I) cruel and unusual punishment: McDougle v. Maxwell, 1 Ohio St. 2d 68, 203
N.E.2d 314 (1964). (J) right to counsel: Murphy v. Maxwell, 177 Ohio St. 174, 203
N.E2d 233 (1964); Bussey v. Maxwell, 177 Ohio St. 111, 202 N.E2d 698 (1964) ;
Freeman v. Maxwell, 177 Ohio St. 93, 202 N.E.2d 623 (1964) ; Madison v. Maxwell,
177 Ohio St. 84, 202 N.E.2d 617 (1964) ; Johnson v. Maxwell, 177 Ohio St. 72, 20Z
N.E.2d 417 (1964); Colan v. Haskins, 177 Ohio St. 65, 202 N.E2d 419 (1964);
McQueen v. Maxwell, 177 Ohio St. 30, 201 N.E.2d 701 (1964) ; Troxell v. Maxwell,
177 Ohio St. 8, 201 N.E2d 522 (1964); Thomas v. Maxwell, 175 Ohio St. 233, 193
N.E.2d 150 (1963) ; Meadows v. Maxwell, 175 Ohio St. 213, 192 N.E2d 781 (1963).
(K) legally incompetent counsel: Weston v. Haskins, 177 Ohio St. 110, 202 N.E.2d 697
(1964) ; Ulrich v. Maxwell, 177 Ohio St. 108, 202 N.E2d 702 (1964).
59 Compare Schaber v. Maxwell, supra note 38; Gallagher v. Maxwell, 175
Ohio St. 440, 195 N.E2d 810 (1964); Rodriquez v. Sacks, 173 Ohio St. 456, 184
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settled at this date that right-to-counsel is an issue which is cognizable in
a habeas corpus proceeding. 60 In these cases the supreme court simply
ignores its usual concern with jurisdiction of the trial court or the ade-
quacy of review by appeal. In addition, two recent cases have seemingly
allowed a petitioner to attack his indictment collaterally albeit not success-
fully.6 ' The overall thrust of the Ohio Supreme Court's pronouncements in
the field of habeas corpus is to reduce the writ to solely a preconviction
remedy for illegal detention.62 The difficulty results from the fact that the
Ohio Supreme Court makes the transition from one position to another
leaving behind only the scattered remains of inconsistent case holdings.
There are no express overrulings of previous inconsistent cases, nor are
there any lucid opinions setting forth the court's position. The writ of
habeas corpus is too deeply rooted in our system of law to allow it to be
treated on a case-to-case basis or limited and extended by judicial fiat. It
is unfortunate that the Ohio Supreme Court has chosen to limit the writ,
for in so doing, it has altered part of the dual court concept so ingrained
in our system of federalism. If the court does not live up to its obligation,
the Ohio prisoner will be forced to turn to the federal courts in an attempt
to obtain the remedy denied by the courts of his own state . 3
N.E2d 93 (1962); Doughty v. Sacks, 173 Ohio St. 407, 183 N.E.2d 368 (1962),
rev'd, vacated and remanded per curiam sub norn. Doughty v. Maxwell, 372 U.S. 781
(1962), reaff'd sub norn. Doughty v. Sacks, 175 Ohio St. 46, 191 N.E.2d 727 (1963),
rev'd per curiam sub nor. Doughty v. Maxwell, 376 U.S. 202 (1964), with Johnson
v. Maxwell, 177 Ohio St. 72, 202 N.E.2d 417 (1964). For a discussion of right-to-
counsel and the Doughty case, see 25 Ohio St. L.J. 435 (1964).
60 Yarbrough v. Maxwell, 1 Ohio St. 2d 91, - N.E.2d - (1965); Dodds v.
Haskins, 1 Ohio St. 2d 82, - N.E.2d - (1965); Freeman v. Maxwell, 177
Ohio St. 84, 202 N.E.2d 617 (1964) ; Johnson v. Maxwell, supra note 59; Colan v.
Haskins, 177 Ohio 65, 202 N.E2d 623 (1964) ; Troxell v. Maxwell, 177 Ohio St. 8,
201 N.E.2d 705 (1964).
61 Braxton v. Maxwell, 1 Ohio St. 2d 134, - N.E.2d - (1965); Carter v.
Maxwell, 177 Ohio St. 35, 201 N.E.2d 705 (1964).
62 In one recent case the Ohio Supreme Court, in dictum, stated that this was the
status of habeas corpus in Ohio. Walker v. Maxwell, supra note 43, at 137, - N.E.2d
at - If this statement is true, what is the basis for the right-to-counsel cases? Per-
haps the court is treating this particular constitutional defect as a loss of jurisdiction
in a fundamental rather than a traditional sense.
63 At the time this issue went to press, the Governor of Ohio had signed into
law §§ 2953.21-24 of the Ohio Revised Code to provide a post-conviction procedure.
The statute is similar to the Nebraska statute referred to in Case v. Nebraska, 85
S. Ct. 1483 (1965).
